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Abstract 
Verifiable Secret Image Sharing has become an important field of study in modern cryptography. As the era demands the need of 
security and verifiability to resist cheating scenario, a new secret image sharing scheme identifying the existence of cheater is 
introduced and analyzed in this paper. A method to ensure integrity of secret image prior to its recovery is proposed. An n x n 
secret image and n x n verification image are used to generate shares which are embedded into a cover image for transmission. 
Structural similarity and mean square error measure of reconstructed verification image with original verification image verifies 
the coherence of the secret. Computational cost of this method is low which makes it suitable for covert message communication 
and sharing of scanned documents. 
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1. Introduction 
Secret Image sharing refers to a cryptographic technique in which secret image is divided into a number of 
share images with or without modification and the secret image can be retrieved by combining all or predefined 
collection of share images. In any basic secret image sharing protocol there are two entities - Dealer and 
Participants. Dealer is an entity who handles the task of share construction and distributes these shares to various 
distributed participants. Participants are those entities who receive the share images from dealer and participate in 
secret recovery process. A dishonest entity may tamper the share, thereby making the secret reconstruction 
ambiguous. This poses a security breach and integrity of secret image is lost, which requires the need of extending 
ordinary secret image sharing scheme. 
Security of secret sharing scheme is defined under the assumption that all the participants and the dealer 
involved are honest. If any one of the entities acts as cheater and tries to damage the shares, secret recovery is 
compromised. Hence, there is need for Verifiable Secret Image Sharing. 
 
 
 
                         
                       …. 
Participants 
Fig 1: Share Construction and Distribution 
In a Verifiable Secret Image Sharing Scheme, two types of attack can occur. Either dealer or participants can 
act as dishonest. Dealer may distribute incorrect share images to some of the participants or a participant may supply 
an incorrect share image, when a group of participants are trying to recover the original secret image. Dealer can be 
a sender who wishes to share secret image or a trusted third party. Sometimes dealer plays the role as cheater and it 
may intentionally or deliberately create wrong shares to distribute, thus hinder secret sharing. But rarely this kind of 
scenario can occur; in most cases this won’t happen. While designing a secret sharing scheme, one should be aware 
of these attacks. As visual secret sharing and its application continue to be studied extensively, the cheating problem 
has become an important issue. The cheating process stacks damage share and genuine share together to retrieve 
secret. Verifiability allows involved participants to detect cheaters during secret retrieval process. 
Many existing schemes make use of additional authentication shares for verifying the integrity of shares16, or 
keeping additional transparencies17 for verification purpose. Both involve additional overhead. Wang et.al5 proposed 
a (2,2) secret sharing scheme1, which verifies the integrity of share images with the help of watermark image. At the 
same time, it employs an image chaotic technique called torus automorphism22 during share construction phase. 
Torus automorphism is much time consuming and timestamp varying in accordance with characteristics of input 
image. The security of Wang’s scheme is primarily defined in terms of torus automorphism and the shares produced 
are of meaningless or not realistic in nature.  
Defining characteristics of share image is trivial i.e., shares should not reveal any information or hint about the 
secret image and also be less susceptible to malicious attacks during transit. In our scheme, we assume that a dealer 
is a trusted entity. Interactive participants may or may not act as cheater. The proposed scheme verifies the integrity 
of secret image with the help of verification image. Shares produced are realistic images. Low computational 
requirements and security features makes this scheme suitable for real time applications such as covert message 
Dealer 
1 2 3 4 
n 
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communication over internet and sharing of scanned documents. The scheme verifies the integrity of secret image 
prior to its recovery based on the structural similarity and mean square error measure of verification image with the 
reconstructed one. In the rest of this paper, section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 introduces our verifiable secret 
image sharing scheme in detail. Section 4 discuses the experimental results.  Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.   
2. Literature Review 
In 1979 Blakley1 and Shamir2 first proposed the concept of secret sharing through a (t,n) threshold scheme. i.e. t 
out of n shares are required to reconstruct the secret. As secret image sharing and its application continued to be 
studied extensively, (n, n) and (2, 2) scheme got more attention among other schemes. 
Naor and Shamir3 were the first to propose a (t, n) visual cryptography technique that involves dividing an 
image into n different shares. The secret image could be reconstructed by stacking at least t shares among the n 
share images and stacking of < t shares never allow the decryption to be successful. Many visual secret image 
sharing methods have been proposed in the past few years, few of the schemes4 are designed to allow a particular 
subgroup of defined participants needed to decrypt the secret, and some18, 19 designed to allow any sub-group of n 
participants, and these are the most popular. Among them, (2, n) and (n, n) schemes are widely used. 
Lukac and Plataniotis proposed bit level-based image secret-sharing12, where a gray or color image is 
decomposed into several binary bit-planes. Each bit-plane is treated as a binary secret image that is processed using 
Visual Cryptography (VC) encryption to form two share images. After that, two gray or color-share images are 
generated by composing all the binary share images through stacking these bit-planes. This scheme lacks 
verification ability and it’s difficult to manage noise like shares. Pixel expansion is also a drawback. 
Tsai et al. proposed an image-sharing scheme9 that combines image-hiding and VC. In this scheme, secrets are 
divided into multiple parts that are hidden in the bit-planes of a set of cover images to form stego-images. The aim 
of this scheme is to prevent anyone who processes only one stego-image from gaining information about the secret. 
As VC and VC-based applications continue to be studied extensively, the cheating problem-stacking fake and 
genuine share together to reveal the secret-that exists in VC has been highlighted, and preventing cheating has 
become an important issue. In 2007, Horng et al.13 proposed a method to identify cheaters with the cost of additional 
authentication shares which authenticate the integrity of shares prior to stacking them. This method is not 
computationally effective as well as noise like shares bring extra cost of managing shares. The shares produced are 
larger than secret image. 
 
Most of the verifiable secret-sharing schemes proposed allow participants to verify only their received shares 
instead of reconstructed secret image, but many have the issues of bad recovering quality, pixel expansion (share 
size), computational complexity, security and accuracy. Wang et al.5 proposed a visual sharing method with 
verification ability which first applies few equations to encode a watermark image and a secret image into two non-
expanded sharing image. This is followed by scrambling of two sharing images using torus automorphism. In this 
scheme, it is difficult to manage meaningless shares and Torus automorphism consumes time to scramble images.   
 
Recently in 2013, Hao-Kuan Tso proposed a scheme7 in which gray scale image is converted to bit plane 
images and each bit plane image along with seed and verification image encoded image is produced. This scheme is 
capable of producing meaningful shares as well as solves pixel expansion problem, however meaningless are not 
realistic images and hence still attracts attacker’s attention. In this scheme, both seed and verification image need to 
be kept secret. Another issue is one of the shared images cannot reveal any information of the original images. 
However, whenever enough shared images are obtained, the original information would be revealed progressively. 
 
Our scheme addresses the issues identified in the existing schemes. The proposed scheme produces realistic 
shares which follows same size correlation with the secret image. This secure scheme verifies the integrity of shares 
prior to its recovery. 
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3.  Proposed Scheme 
The proposed scheme consists of three phases: Share Construction Phase, Information Hiding Phase and 
Revealing and Verification Phase as shown in Fig.2. 
An n × n binary verification image and n × n binary secret image are input to the share construction phase and 
two share images share1 and share 2 are produced. Share construction is carried out at bit-level using Eqn. (1) and 
Eqn. (2). Details of share construction algorithms described in the next section. Produced shares do not reveal any 
information regarding both secret as well as verification image. During Information Hiding phase, generated shares 
are separately hidden inside two user selected n × n grayscale cover images and stego-share images are produced. 
Now the resulted shares are meaningful. These shares are sent to various participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2: The proposed scheme 
In order to recover the secret image in a lossless manner, interactive participants collect the share images and 
reconstruct the verification image first, followed by secret image recovery. The verification image helps participants 
to identify whether the collected shares are damaged. The detailed description of each phase is given in the 
following subsections. 
A. Share Construction Phase  
Share construction phase consist of 4 steps as illustrated in flow chart Fig.3. Dealer initiates the activities of 
share construction utilizing the equations rather than merely depending on any code book. The resulted shares are 
then given to next phase. The original secret image ܱ and Verification image ܸ are input to this phase. First of all 
two shares are constructed using Eqn. (1) and (2) 5. 
  ௜ܵ௝஺ ൌ ቔቀ൫ ௜ܱ௝ ൈ ʹ ൅ ௜ܸ௝ ൅ ͳ൯݉݋݀Ͷቁ Ȁʹቕ        ሺͳሻ   
   ௜ܵ௝஻ ൌ උ൫ ௜ܱ௝ ൈ ʹ ൅ ௜ܸ௝ ൅ ͳ൯݉݋݀ʹඏ            ሺʹሻ 
However, it is observed that, produced shares are informative i.e. it reveals some information regarding secret 
and verification image. So, in order to scramble the pixel information further, we followed Arnold transformation18 
technique and finally, share ܵ஺ and share ୆  are produced. 
 
Secret Image      Verification Image 
 
 
 
 
 
Share1                                      Share2 
 
 
Share1 
 
Share1                                       Share2 
 
 
 
 
 
Recovered             Recovered 
      Secret Image      Verification Image 
      Share Construction Phase 
      Information Hiding Phase 
                 Revealing and  
         Verification Phase 
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Fig. 3: Share Construction Phase 
Algorithm 1               Share construction algorithm 
Input:  An HൈW Original secret image ൌ ൫୧୨൯,  
   an H ൈ W Verification image ൌ ൫୧୨൯,  
   Where i = 0, 1, · · · , H - 1 and j =0, 1, · · · , W - 1. 
Output:  Two H ൈ W noise-like share images ୅ ൌ ൫୧୨୅൯  and ୆ ൌ ൫୧୨୆൯ Where i = 0,1, · · · , H -1 and  
 j = 0, 1, · · · , W - 1. 
begin 
1:  Set i = 0 and j = 0,  
2:  Read pixel ௜ܱ௝from the secret image ܱ  and read verification pixel ௜ܸ௝  from the verification imageܸ. 
3:  repeat 
4:  Obtain pixel of share ܵ஺ , utilizing Eqn.ሺͳሻ 
5:   Find the value for pixel of shareܵ஻, using Eqn.ሺʹሻ 
6:   until all pixels are processed 
7:  Apply Arnold Transformation to permute them to become random share images ܵ஺ andܵ஻, sized H×W.  
end 
 
 Arnold transformation serves two purposes. One is security of the scheme improved and other is to make 
shares suitable for applying BPCS Steganography during Information Hiding Phase.  
B. Information Hiding Phase  
Two noise-like random shares are hidden inside user-selected camouflage images by applying steganography 
technique. Bit-Plane Complexity Steganography (BPCS) Technique15 is used for this purpose. In this scheme, cover 
image is divided into bit-plane images and complex blocks are found based on black and white border length. The 
complex block of bit plane images is replaced with random binary patterns. BPCS Steganography involves two 
processes, embedding and extraction. During BPCS embedding, complex regions in each bit-plane of cover image 
are replaced with random share blocks i.e. Resulted stego share images are meaningful and realistic picture of higher 
quality. The overall block diagram of BPCS embedding steps is shown in Fig.5. The secret image can be either 
share1 or share2. Once complex blocks are replaced, bit plane images are combined back to form stego share images 
(Fig.4). These stego shares are then sent to the participants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: 
Read the 
next pixels 
Step 2: Generate pixels 
of share ܵ஺ 
Step 3: Generate pixels 
of share ܵ஻ 
Step 4: 
Apply Arnold 
Transformation 
Original 
imageܱ  
Verification 
image ܸ 
Share SA       
Share SB     
  Share SA      
 Share SB     
              Share 1      Share 2 
        
 
 
 
                  
             
                          Stego-Share 1     Stego-Share 2 
 Fig. 4:  Share Construction and Distribution 
Information Hiding Phase 
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Fig. 5: BPCS Embedding 
 
Interactive participants do the reverse process to recover the shares SA and SB once they receive stego share images. 
This process is called as BPCS Extraction and the steps are illustrated in Fig.6 and finally random shares are 
recovered. The stego Image can be of either stego-share1 or stego-share2. 
 
      Stego image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
                         Fig.6: BPCS Extraction 
C. Revealing and Verification Phase 
Revealing and verification phase is the final and trivial phase of the proposed method. The proposed revealing 
and verifying phase allows the deﬁned participants to extract the embedded verification image and reconstruct the 
secret image from two random shares, ܵ஺ and ܵ஻. This operation is carried out in bit-level using Eqn. (3) and (4) 5 
௜ܱ௝
ᇱ ൌ ቔቀ൫ ௜ܵ௝஺ ൈ ʹ ൅ ௜ܵ௝஻ ൅ ͵൯݉݋݀Ͷቁ Ȁʹቕ           ሺ͵ሻ  
 ௜ܸ௝ᇱ ൌ උ൫ ௜ܵ௝஺ ൈ ʹ ൅ ௜ܵ௝஻ ൅ ͵൯݉݋݀ʹඏ                                            ሺͶሻ 
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The quality of the reconstructed secret image is same as that of the original secret image and has no distortion. 
Moreover, the procedure helps legitimate participants to verify the reconstructed secret image ܱᇱ  based on the 
extracted verification image ܸᇱ. Overall working of this phase is illustrated in Fig.7. 
 
 
 
 
 
     
                                                                      Fig. 7: Revealing and verification Phase 
 
Algorithm 2              Revealing algorithm 
Input:  Two HൈW noise-like random share images ܵ஺ ൌ ൫ ௜ܵ௝஺൯  and ܵ஻ ൌ ൫ ௜ܵ௝஻൯ 
   where i = 0, 1, · · ·,H - 1 and  j =0, 1, · · · , W - 1. 
Output:  An HൈW reconstructed secret imageܱᇱ ൌ ൫ ௜ܱ௝ᇱ ൯,  
  an H ൈ W  reconstructed verification image ܸᇱ ൌ ൫ ௜ܸ௝ᇱ ൯ 
begin 
1: Perform inverse Arnold transformation and obtain the intermediate shares ୅and ୆ 
2: Set i = 0 and j = 0, Read the pixel  ୧୨୅  of share୅  and the pixel ୧୨୆ of share ୆ 
3:  repeat 
4:  Reconstruct pixel of secret image୧୨ᇱ  using Eqn.ሺ͵ሻ 
5:       Reconstruct pixel of verification image  ୧୨ᇱ   using Eqn.ሺͶሻ 
6:   until all pixels are processed 
7: Determine the difference between the original verification image and the reconstructed verification image  
end 
 
The extracted verification image can be verified by using mean square error (MSE)21 and Structural Similarity Index 
value test14. If the MSE value is equal to 0 or Structural Similarity Index value is equal to 1, the extracted 
verification image is same as the hidden one and there has been no cheating by the participant. Otherwise, the 
receiver can ask the dealer to distribute the entire share again.  
4. Experiments  
The proposed method is implemented in Matlab 2010 b. The results obtained are discussed. To demonstrate 
how the scheme successfully achieves general criteria such as security, accuracy, computational complexity, and 
pixel expansion, this section presents a set of experimental results. Experimental results on four general criteria are 
discussed in subsections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. 
  
To illustrate our scheme, we used a set of test images as shown in Fig.8. The set contains 512 x 512 binary 
images: “Peppers,” “GoldHill,” and 512 x 512 grayscale images: “lena,” ”baboon”. In the test set, “Peppers” serve as 
the secret image, while “GoldHill,” serves as the verification image which are used to verify the reconstructed secret 
images. Cover images are “lena,” and “baboon”. 
 
                                                                             Reconstructed              
Share SA                                                             Secret Image O’ 
 
 
 
 
Share SB                Reconstructed            
                 Verification Image V’ 
Reconstruction and 
extracting 
verification image 
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Secret Image 
Peppers.png 
 
Verification Image 
GoldHill.png 
 
 
Cover Image 1 
Lena.png 
 
Cover Image 2 
Baboon.png 
Fig.8: Test Images 
The secret “peppers” and verification image “Goldhill” are input to share construction phase and the produced two 
shares are shown in Fig. 9(a) & 9(b). 
 
 
(a) Share 1 
 
                    (b) Share2 
 
(c)  StegoShare1 
          47.70 dB 
 
(d) Stego Share2 
47.70 dB 
 
(e) Recovered Verification Image 
MSE =0 
SSIM Index value = 1 
 
 
(f) Recovered Secret 
PSNR =∞ 
Fig.9: Resulted Images 
Share1 was hidden inside “lena” cover image during BPCS embedding process and stego share 1 was produced as 
shown in Fig.9 (c). Similarly, share2 was hidden inside “baboon” image to form stego share2 as shown in Fig.9 (d). 
These are meaningful shares which are sent to participants. Later, original shares are extracted from these shares 
during BPCS extraction step. During Revealing and validation, we recovered the verification image first and the 
resulted image is same as the original verification image as shown in Fig.9 (e). Finally, secret image is recovered 
lossless with PSNR value ‘∞’ as shown in Fig.9 (f). 
4.1  Security analysis. To guarantee that our scheme satisfies the security criterion i.e. it avoids leaking any 
information about the original secret image, Arnold transformation is used. It relocates the constructed share pixels 
after they have been generated. The sets of shares generated by our scheme are shown in Fig.9 (a) & 9(b). Also 
complex BPCS Steganography technique further hides the existence of these shares by producing quality stego 
images as in Fig.8 (c) & 9(d).  
 
4.2 Accuracy. In our experiments, the peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) is used to evaluate the quality of the 
reconstructed secret image with original secret.  
 
The peak signal-to-noise ratio measures the quality by first calculating the mean squared error (MSE) and then 
dividing the maximum range of the data type by the MSE as shown in Eqn. (5). 
  ܴܲܵܰ ൌ ͳͲ ൈ ଵ଴
ଶହହమ
ெௌா            (5) 
 ܯܵܧ ൌ ଵௐൈு σ σ ሺܳ௑௒ െ ܳԢ௑௒ሻ
ଶு
௒ୀଵ
ௐ
௑ୀଵ                    (6) 
 
For an original gray scale image with a size of H×W, the corresponding MSE is defined in Eqn. (6). Basically, 
PSNR value should range from 30dB to 40dB if a scheme offers good visual quality. The PSNR value equals to ∞ 
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denotes maximum quality. To determine the accuracy of our scheme, recovered secret image is compared with 
original image. 
 
4.3 Computational complexity. According to the descriptions of our proposed scheme, the computational cost 
depends on only two operations: the sum operation and Arnold transformation in share construction phase. Clearly, 
the complexity of the sum operation is very low and has very little effect on the computational complexity of our 
scheme. The execution time of our scheme for “pepper” and “baboon” is shown in Table 1. 
 
   Table 1 Execution time 
Share 1 Share 2 
3.756362 seconds 3.754314 seconds 
 
4.4  Pixel expansion. During the share construction process, our proposed scheme generates two shares each 
with size of original secret. Table 2 shows the correlation between the original image size and the share size. 
 
   Table 2: Size Comparison 
Image Binary images 
Size of the original image 2097152 bytes 
Size of the share SA 2097152 bytes 
Size of the shareSB 2097152 bytes 
 
4.5  Evaluation of verifying. The mean square error (MSE) and Structural Similarity value is used to identify 
whether cheating has occurred by comparing the content of an original verification image with that of an extracted 
one. If the MSE value is equal to zero or SSIM index value is equal to 1, there is no difference between images. If 
the MSE value is not equal to zero or SSIM index value is not equal to one, then reconstructed secret image I′ is 
unreliable. Fig.4.2 (e) & (f) show the extracted verification image and the reconstructed secret images and their 
verification results. Experiments were conducted using database 23. Results are given in Appendix A. 
 
Experiments were conducted by partially damaging a share  by adding black pixels (Black Damage), white 
pixels (White Damage), mixing with any images (Mix Damage), random pixels (Random Damage) etc; the 
corresponding MSE of the extracted verification image is not equal to “0” or SSIM Index value not equal to “1” for 
“Peppers” and “Baboon”. Details are shown in Table 3. 
 
    Table 3:  Verification Result (“Share1 is partially damaged”) 
White Damage Black Damage Mix Damage 
Random 
Damage 
0.17 (MSE) .07 .31 .12 
.9901(SSIM index) .996241 .964165 .99554 
The result is graphically represented in Fig 10. It shows the verification result values of MSE value (>0) and 
SSIM index value (< 1) under various damage scenarios.  
 
    Fig.10: Verification Result 
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Proposed visual secret-sharing scheme for binary images satisfies the four general criteria required for visual 
secret sharing systems. Moreover, the computational complexity of our proposed scheme is very low, so it is 
suitable for real-time applications. 
5. Conclusion 
Secret sharing schemes are ideal for storing information that is highly sensitive and highly important. A 
verifiable secret sharing scheme allows participants to be certain that no other participants are lying about the 
contents of their shares up to a reasonable probability of error. The scheme satisfies the basic features of secret 
sharing scheme and it solves the issues identified in Wang et.al scheme. Shares of secret are meaningful and hence 
don’t attract the attention of intruders.  
 
The proposed scheme is capable of identifying whether cheater exists or not. The work can be extended to find 
out exact cheater identification and tampered location in case of damage to share occurs. Further, we can extend the 
scheme to (t, n) visual secret sharing scheme applicable for various image types. 
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Appendix A 
 
Images in database are resized to 512 ൈ512 size. Secret and Verification images are binary images and 
 Cover image 1 and Cover image 2 are grayscale images. 
Secret Image  Verification 
Image 
CoverImage  1 Cover Image 2 StegoShare 1 StegoShare2 Recovered 
Verifcation 
Image 
Recovered 
Secret  
Image 
Kodim01 
16.7 KB 
Kodim02 
2.03KB 
Kodim03 
129 KB 
Kodim04 
143 KB 41.9282 dB 46.5717 dB 
 
 
MSE=0 
SSIM =1 
PSNR= ∞ 
16.7KB 
Kodim03 
8.89KB 
Kodim04 
6.12KB 
Kodim07 
134 KB 
Kodim08 
176 KB 42.6146 dB 47.4061 dB 
PSNR= ∞ 
8.89KB 
Kodim05 
11.3 KB 
Kodim06 
10.5 KB 
Kodim11 
152 KB 
Kodim12 
133 KB 
46.8763 dB 46.1244 dB PSNR= ∞ 
11.3KB 
Kodim07 
10.2 KB 
Kodim08 
13.3 KB 
Kodim15 
137  KB 
Kodim16 
141 KB 
48.6717dB 46.7602dB PSNR= ∞ 
10.2KB 
Kodim09 
7.41 KB 
Kodim10 
7.41 KB 
Kodim19 
146 KB 
Kodim20 
110 KB 
48.55dB 41.4596dB PSNR= ∞ 
7.41KB 
Kodim11 
10.1  KB 
Kodim12 
3.06 KB 
Kodim23 
123 KB 
Kodim24 
161 KB 
44.7324 dB 46.3761dB PSNR= ∞ 
10.1KB 
Kodim13 
14.1 KB 
Kodim14 
11.2 KB 
Kodim07 
134 KB 
Kodim08 
176 KB 
42.7317dB 47.4847dB PSNR= ∞ 
14.1KB 
Kodim15 
3.90 KB 
Kodim16 
5.171 KB 
Kodim11 
152 KB 
Kodim12 
133 KB 
46.8748dB 45.8161dB PSNR= ∞ 
3.90KB 
Kodim17 
7.02 KB 
Kodim18 
6.91 KB 
Kodim15 
137  KB 
Kodim16 
141 KB 
43.253dB 46.175dB PSNR= ∞ 
7.02KB 
Kodim19 
6.66 KB 
Kodim20 
3.67 KB 
Kodim23 
123 KB 
Kodim24 
161 KB 
45.1812dB 46.7923dB PSNR= ∞ 
6.66KB 
Kodim21 
9.99 KB 
Kodim22 
8.18 KB 
Kodim19 
146 KB 
Kodim20 
110 KB 
48.648dB 49.3497dB PSNR= ∞ 
9.99KB 
Kodim23 
5.52 KB 
Kodim24 
11.4 KB 
Kodim03 
129 KB 
Kodim04 
143 KB 
41.6513dB 47.2861dB PSNR= ∞ 
5.52KB 
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